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 This study uses the framework of the agency theory to systematically investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms; board of directors’ 
characteristics (board size, board independence, duality, board meetings, and 
director’s  ownership)  and  audit  committee  size  with  the  level  of  information  
asymmetry in UAE. The multiple regression analysis provides evidence that board 
size is significantly positive related to information asymmetry. While board 
independence, board meetings, directors’ ownership and audit committee size have a 
significantly negative association related to information asymmetry. The findings 
show  that  the  information  asymmetry  among  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  
companies is high and the implementation of the Code of Corporate Governance 
more likely to be underdevelopment. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
 
The asymmetry lies in the difference between what the most informed stakeholders 
know but the uninformed stakeholders are not informed about certain information. 
This link impacts growth options, risk, managerial incentives and other factors which 
mean that the relation does not stem out from an intrinsic doubt regarding the firm 
performance  (Hilary,  2006).  Information  asymmetry  also  means  when  one  or  more  
investors are privy to the firm’s value while the rest can only access public 
information (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007). Relationships between companies and 
upstream suppliers have always been characterized by information asymmetries in a 
way that one member of the party to the transaction has more information compared 
to the other (Martin & Johnson, 2010). For instance, information asymmetries stem 
from hidden actions, meaning to say that the firm has no idea how the upstream 
supplier will react when he is acting in an unethical way. 
The actual elimination of information asymmetry’s negative impact can be carried out 
through maximizing the access to information regarding the company that is non-
standard and through the increase of the information visibility of what the company 
offers the stakeholders. The risk lies in the varying interpretation of the information 
that the company provides which may lead to different stakeholder behavior (Jasso, 
2009). According to Mercer (2004), information precision is an attribute of 
information that underlies disclosure credibility. It is evident that asymmetric 
information is related with information disclosure. In other words, the less the 
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